We show that in large symmetric auctions with conditionally i.i.d. common values and CARA preferences, the second-price auction raises more revenue than the …rst-price auction. We also show by an example that the ranking does not extend to general symmetric risk-averse preferences.
Introduction
In this paper, we analyze common value auctions where a single object is sold to a large number of risk-averse bidders with conditionally i.i.d. signals on the true value of the object. We compute the symmetric equilibrium revenues of …rst-and secondprice auctions for the case of CARA preferences. It is well-known that in the case of risk-neutral bidders, the two auction formats yield asymptotically the same revenue. We show that when the bidders have CARA utility functions SPA dominates FPA in terms of expected revenues. We also provide an example with risk-averse bidders with non-CARA utility functions where FPA dominates SPA.
With private values, risk-aversion tends to favor …rst-price auction over secondprice auction since the expected payment is less risky in the former (see e.g. Holt Department of Economics, Aalto University, and HECER pauli.murto@aalto.…. y Department of Economics, Aalto University, and HECER juuso.valimaki@aalto.….
(1980), Matthews (1987) , and Maskin & Riley (1984) ). Our auction model is a special case of an auction with a¢ liated common values. Milgrom & Weber (1982) showed in this setting that the second-price auction yields a higher expected revenue in the case with risk-neutral bidders. Bali & Jackson (2002) and Kremer (2002) show that in the risk-neutral case, this source of advantage vanishes as the number of bidders tends to in…nity. Our model indicates that the e¤ect of risk aversion remains in that limit and works in the opposite direction in comparison to small auctions with private values.
Our revenue ranking result stems from the di¤erence in the informativeness of equilibrium price across the auction formats. Even though the interim expected payo¤ of each individual bidder converges to zero in both formats due to competitive bidding, the distribution of ex post gains matters as long as the bidders are riskaverse. This translates into di¤erent ex ante revenues. Since the equilibrium price is more informative in the second-price auction than in the …rst-price auction, a CARA bidder is willing to pay more on average in that auction format.
The key step in our analysis reduces the statistical inference in a symmetric BNE of each of the auctions to a Bayesian learning problem about the parameter of an exponential distribution. In Murto & Välimäki (2013) , we used the same statistical observation to compute equilibrium timing decisions in a social learning problem. We combine this statistical fact with the observation that in auctions with a large number of symmetric bidders the winner must be indi¤erent between winning and not winning. This requirement arises from an arbitrage condition: large auctions have many agents with similar information and therefore competition for the scarce resource drives out rents. Since the payo¤ equalization from winning and losing the auction holds only in the limit with large numbers of bidders, our analysis does not provide a ranking for …nite auctions.
It would be tempting to extend our analysis to more general auction formats. Within the common values model that we analyze, a problem arises in the …rst step of the analysis. It is by no means clear that formats such as all-pay auction have a monotonic pure-strategy equilibrium with a …nite number of bidders. Hence our technique that relies on the extreme order statistics in a growing sample is no longer applicable in that case. The key requirement for generalizing the insights from the current paper is therefore that the …nite version of the game should have a symmetric monotonic equilibrium in pure strategies.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets up the basic model. Section 3 establishes the basic statistical properties of equilibrium learning. Section 4 shows that second-price auction dominates …rst-price auction in terms of expected revenue for CARA utilities.
Setup
Let V 2 (0; 1) denote the common (random) value of the object. Prior to participating in an auction, each bidder i 2 f1; :::; N g observes a (symmetric) signal i 2 [0; 1] distributed according to a joint distribution g ( i ; v) that has a continuous conditional density function g ( i jv ) : We assume that g ( i jv ) is bounded and the monotone likelihood ration property (MLRP) holds:
when 0 > and v 0 > v. Furthermore, we assume that conditional on v; i is independent of j for i 6 = j: The prior density on V is denoted by (v) : Since we are ultimately interested in large auctions, our interest will focus around players with very high signals and we de…ne
By MLRP, v is increasing in v: After observing i ; each i chooses a bid b i ( i ) : Bidder i wins with positive probability only if b i b j for all j: The winning bidder pays the k th highest bid b (k) for k 2 f1; 2g. The losing bidders do not make any payments. Let u V b (k) denote the utility of the bidder who receives the good. We normalize to zero the utility of not receiving the good. We assume that u ( ) is a strictly increasing and (weakly) concave function and that the players maximize their expected utility. The bidders do not know each others' realized bids when preparing their own bids. For the case of risk-neutral bidders, the form of the symmetric equilibrium strategies is documented in Milgrom & Weber (1982) . A similar construction holds for the symmetric case with risk-averse bidders. In particular, it is known that there is a unique equilibrium strategy pro…le, where bids are strictly increasing in signals:
Proposition 1 In both …rst-and second-price auction formats, a unique equilibrium strategy pro…le exists in the class of symmetric and strictly increasing bid functions.
Proof. For the second price auction, Theorem 3.1 of Milgrom (1981a) gives existence and characterization of a strictly increasing symmetric equilibrium. Uniqueness in the class of symmetric bid functions is given in the Theorem by Levin & Harstad (1986) . Alternatively, the proof of Pesendorfer & Swinkels (1997) in the risk neutral case can be adapted for the present case. For the …rst price auction, the result can be found in McAdams (2007) .
For a game with n players, we denote the equilibrium bid function as b 1 n ( ) for the …rst price auction and b 2 n ( ) for the second price auction. Note that in a strictly monotonic equilibrium, the realized price is a function of the highest signals in the bidder population. Therefore, the price distribution in large auctions derives from the statistical properties of the highest order-statistics in large samples. We turn to that next.
Price distribution
Consider the random sample f 1 ; :::; n g of realized signals. The equilibrium bids given the two highest observations, i.e. the realized values of the order statistics (k) n for k = 1; 2 determine the equilibrium prices
for the …rst-and second-price auctions, respectively. A simple computation (or alternatively a direct application of Gnedenko's Theorem on extreme order statistics) shows that conditional on V = v; the normalized order statistic Z (1) n := n 1
(1) n converges in distribution to an exponentially distributed random variable with parameter v as n ! 1: This result is easy to generalize to k …rst order statistic (where k is any positive integer). For convenience, we record this statistical result in the proposition below (see Gnedenko (1943) and Murto & Välimäki (2013) for proof):
denote the normalized k th order statistic in the sample f 1 ; :::; n g. Then, the vector
converges in distribution to a vector of k independent exponential random variables with parameter v .
Hence, in particular, Z (k) n converges to a random variable Z (k) with a Gamma distribution with parameters (k; v ). This means that as n increases towards in…nity, the information content in the …rst and second order statistics of the bidders'signals converges to the information content of two independent exponentially distributed random variables with unknown parameter v . Intuitively, 1 (1) corresponds to one exponential random variable, and
(2) corresponds to another independent exponential variable with the same parameter. We show that the large-game limit price distribution is pinned down by two e¤ects: 1) inference is equivalent to exponential learning as indicated by Proposition 2, and 2) competition dissipates the bidders' information rents. To formalize this, we de…ne willingness to pay under exponential learning:
is the highest price that a buyer is willing to pay, conditional on
In terms of our model, this implies that b k (z) is the unique solution to
To compute the expected utility in (1), note that the posterior density
The expected value of u V b k (z) can therefore be computed as follows:
Our next proposition shows that the equilibrium price in k th -price auction converges to the willingness to pay conditional on the random variable Z (k) , k 2 f1; 2g
as the number of bidders becomes large. In other words, this proposition shows that in the limit, all rents are competed away.
Proposition 3 As n ! 1;
1. The price realization P
The price realization
in a second-price auction converges in
Gamma (2; v ).
Proof. Consider …rst the …rst-price auction. We show that for every z > 0,
Then, by Proposition 2 we can pick a large enough n 0 such that
which means that b 1 n 0 1 z n 0 is not a best-response in a game with n 0 players, and hence cannot be an equilibrium bid. Since this is a contradiction, we have:
i;n := maxf 1 ; :::; i 1 ; i+1 ; :::; n g: Using again Proposition 2, we can …nd a > 0 and an increasing sequence of positive integers fn k g 1 k=1 such that for every k, we have
for some > 0. By the continuity of g ( jv ), there is an " > 0 such that
so that any player with signal > 1 " will make an expected payo¤ above 2 =4 by bidding b 1 n k
(1 z=n k ). Letting k be arbitrarily large (so that n k ! 1), the number of such players goes to in…nity, and therefore their expected joint pro…t explodes. This is a contradiction and it follows that lim inf n!1 b 1 n 1 z n b 1 (z). Since we showed above that lim sup n!1 b
Since the result holds for all z, this implies that
Consider next the second-price auction. As shown in Milgrom (1981b) , the equilibrium bid b 2 n ( ) is the unique solution to
Consider two independent exponential random variables Z
(1)
Exp ( v ). Then, for a …xed z > 0, we have (by Proposition 2):
By (2), we have for all n
and by direct computation (or directly using the memoryless property of exponential random variables), we have
Combining (3) - (5), we have
Since the willingness to pay b 2 (z) is the unique solution to
it follows that lim
Discussion
1. In the risk neutral case we get immediately that:
we see that asymptotic revenue equivalence holds in the risk-neutral case. The implication that P
2. In competitive auctions, risk-neutral bidders get a zero expected payo¤. This generalizes to risk-averse case: the winner is always indi¤erent between getting the object and not.
3. In the …rst-price auction, the bids converge to the willingness to pay and therefore the bidders earn no rents. In the second-price auction, the price is determined by the second highest signal. The winner still has a zero expected payo¤ since the value of the object conditional on the second highest order statistic is the same as the value of the object conditional on the …rst and the second order statistic. This is an immediate consequence of the memoryless property of the underlying exponential distributions. 4. The result on the second-price auction generalizes directly to the case of allocating k identical objects by k + 1 th price auction. In that auction the price re-
, where
The proof is a straight-forward extension of that of Proposition 3.
Equilibrium price distribution with CARA preferences
In this section, we compute in closed form the equilibrium price distributions for the two auctions in the case where the bidders have CARA utility functions. For analytical convenience, we assume that the prior on v is a Gamma distribution with parameters 0 ; 0 . 2 We also assume that
Risk-Neutral Case
Consider inference based on a normalized signal Z = z. It is well known that for an inference about the parameter of an exponential distribution (or Gamma 1 Since the inference is based on two independent exponential random variables Z (1) and Z distribution), Gamma distribution is a conjugate prior. The updated posterior on v is thus also a Gamma distribution with parameters
following an observation of Z Gamma(k; v) :
In the risk neutral case, willingness to pay de…ned in (1) reduces to:
By Proposition 3, the realized price in the k th price auction is then the random variable
where
In the risk neutral case, revenue equivalence between the auction formats follows from (6) and the law of iterated expectation. This may also be directly computed by using the density function formulas of the compound Gamma variable Z (k) .
Equilibrium bids with CARA preferences
With risk-neutral bidders, competitiveness of the auction implies that expected revenue is the same in all relevant auction formats. But this is not the case if bidders are risk-averse. We continue within the parametric example of the previous subsection and assume now CARA preferences:
The utility of a player that buys the object of value V at price p is
The condition for willingness to pay (1) can then be written as:
The willingness to pay is thus the certainty equivalent of the lottery V , given by:
We compute next E e V , when V Gamma( ; ):
Equilibrium bid function in k th price auction then follows:
The realized price is then
where as before Z Gamma (k; V ) ,
Observe that this implies an intuitive comparative statics result: the realized price (and hence expected revenue to the auctioneer) is decreasing in the parameter of risk aversion : For a …xed realization of the normalized order statistic
we have
To see the last inequality, let h := 0 + z (k) and note that:
The expected revenues for the seller can be computed by evaluating the expectation of the winning price P k in equation (8).
Revenue comparison
The main result in this paper is the revenue comparison of the …rst-and secondprice auctions for the limit model with n ! 1 bidders. The key to the proof is the competitiveness of the two auction formats combined with the ranking of the auction formats in terms of price informativeness. In both formats, the winning bidder is indi¤erent between winning and not winning at the equilibrium price. This gives us a way of linking the expected prices across the two auctions with di¤erentially informative signals.
Proposition 4 Suppose that all the buyers have identical CARA payo¤ functions. Then, the expected revenue in the symmetric equilibrium of the second price auction is at least as high as the expected revenue in the symmetric equilibrium of the …rst price auction in the limit model where N ! 1.
Proof. From (7), we know that the equilibrium Price in a …rst price auction for a normalized …rst order statistic z (1) is given by:
Consider now the expected price for the second price auction:
By the law of iterated expectation,
Since log ( ) is a convex function, we have by Jensen's inequality:
Therefore the expected revenue in a SPA exceeds the expected revenue in a FPA.
Discussion
One might wonder whether Proposition 4 extends to an arbitrary risk averse utility function. Indeed, we have shown that in the second-price auction the equilibrium price re ‡ects an additional informative signal in comparison to the …rst-price auction price. One might expect risk-averse bidders to like this reduction of risk, and therefore to pay more on average for the object. However, as already shown in a related context by Milgrom & Weber (1982) , the average willingness to pay for an object increases upon receiving an arbitrary additional signal if and only if utility is CARA. Therefore, if Proposition 4 were to be generalized beyond CARA preferences, the argument would have to be based on the speci…c form of the additional signal that our model generates (i.e. an additional exponentially distributed signal). To close the case, we show by a counterexample that this is not the case. We give an example in this large auction context where the expected revenue in the …rst-price auction exceeds the expected revenue in the second-price auction.
As a preliminary step, assume that bidders are risk-neutral so that u (x) = x. In that case, the equilibrium prices in the …rst and second price auctions are given by random variables P 1 and P 2 :
and
respectively, where Z
Exp ( v ) and Z
Gamma (2; v ). Let us denote by P 1 and P 2 the highest possible price realization in these auctions:
Hence, the support of V P k is given by h P k ; 1 , k = 1; 2. Note that Z (2) = 0 is a stronger positive signal on V than Z (1) = 0, and therefore we have P 2 > P 1 . Hence, the support of V P k is wider in the second-price auction than in the …rst-price auction. Nevertheless, as bidders are risk neutral, the expected price must be the same in both auctions. Now, modify utility function so that there is a kink at some e v 2 P 2 ; P 1 i :
u (x) = ( x for x e v e v 2 (e v x) for x < e v.
This modi…cation increases the bidders'marginal utility at the low end of the support of V P 2 , and therefore to avoid negative expected utility, the equilibrium bid is lower than in the risk-neutral case for some signal realizations (in particular, this is the case for very high signal realizations). On the other hand, the utility function is still linear in the entire support of V P 1 , and therefore this modi…cation has no e¤ect on the bidding behavior in the …rst-price auction. It follows that the expected revenue is higher in the …rst-price auction than in the second-price auction.
